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INTRODUCTION
Efficiency wage models have been used for several decades to explain equilibrium
unemployment; see Salop [1979] and Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]. Much of the work
done on efficiency wages has been concerned with policies to reduce that level of
unemployment. Tax and subsidy policies have been suggested; see Johnson and Layard
[1986]. Monetary policies have also been suggested.
Monetary policy can lower unemployment and have other real effects when effi-
ciency wages are combined with some nominal rigidity. In some models, including
those of Gottfries and Westermark [1998], Stiglitz [1986], and Summers [1988], the
rigidity causes a fixed nominal wage.1 Thus a monetary expansion that raises prices
must lower real wages; this can raise employment and output. But it is important to
note that in each of these models, one effect, central to efficiency wage models, is
assumed either nonexistent or small. When the size of that effect, as estimated in the
literature, is taken into account, the above result is impossible. Instead, monetary
expansions raise employment but lower output. Given this unrealistic result, one
might conclude that at least in their current forms, efficiency wage models with nomi-
nal wage rigidities cannot be plausibly applied to monetary issues or used to justify
monetary policy.
The central effect these models omit or undervalue is that of unemployment on
worker efficiency or productivity. To understand this effect, consider a moral hazard
or shirking model of efficiency wages. In such a model, the threat of firing causes
workers to provide effort, not to shirk. If unemployment is high, it takes longer for a
fired worker to find a new job. So, firing is a greater punishment and workers work
harder to avoid it. In short, greater unemployment causes greater worker effort. That
this is central to efficiency wage models can be seen from the title of the subfield’s
best-known work, “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” by
Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984].
Similar logic holds in efficiency wage models of turnover; see Calvo [1979]. In
these models, high turnover means low efficiency, either due to hiring and training
costs, or due to low-tenure workers being less productive. In these models, as in
shirking models, high unemployment makes it more difficult to find a new job. Work-
ers quit less often, turnover falls, and efficiency rises. Whether turnover or effort is
the motivation, greater unemployment often raises efficiency in efficiency wage models.350 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Once one takes this effect into account, monetary results change. Efficiency may
fall with the monetary expansion for two reasons. It certainly falls when unemploy-
ment falls, as in the above paragraphs. It may also fall if the monetary expansion
lowers real wages. If these effects are great enough, they dominate the rise in employ-
ment, causing a drop in output.
Which effects do dominate? Does output rise or fall with money in efficiency wage
models? To answer these questions, this paper uses a general efficiency wage model
similar to those of Gottfries and Westermark [1998], Stiglitz [1986], and Summers
[1988]. As in those models, nominal wages are rigid in the short run when the money
supply rises. The presence of these nominal wage rigidities has received support in
recent empirical work; see Spencer [1998], Gamber and Joutz [1997], and Holmes and
Hutton [1996].2 With such rigidities, a monetary expansion lowers real wages, raises
employment, and lowers efficiency. One can find a necessary and sufficient condition
for output to fall. The condition is a simple comparison of two elasticities, both of
which have been estimated in the literature. According to these estimates, the condi-
tion holds; output falls when the money supply rises.
It is crucial to note that this result does not imply that an increase in employment
lowers output. It does imply that employment and output move in opposite directions
when some government policy changes the real wage. This should not be surprising;
such results are common in efficiency wage models. In Drazen [1986], Perri [1990],
and Carter [1999b], employment falls and output rises in response to a minimum wage
law. Tariffs may raise employment but lower output in the models of Brecher [1992]
and Agell and Lundborg [1995]. In a model with endogenous monitoring, Shapiro and
Stiglitz [1984, 441] show that policies that lower employment also increase efficiency
so much that output rises. In Carter‘s [1995] efficiency wage model, any government
policy that raises employment must also reduce output. The current analysis extends
this familiar result to the analysis of monetary policy.
Below, a simple efficiency wage model is used to illustrate the crucial relationship
between unemployment and efficiency. In this model, an increase in the money sup-
ply unambiguously lowers output. Later, a more general model is used, in which the
output change is theoretically ambiguous. The ambiguity is resolved using published
empirical results. Alternative efficiency wage models are also considered. The conclu-
sions follow. The main conclusion is that current efficiency wage models with nominal
wage rigidities may not be well-suited to realistic discussions of monetary policy.
A SIMPLE EFFICIENCY WAGE MODEL
The purpose of this section is to show how a monetary expansion unambigu-
ously lowers output in a simple efficiency wage model. To begin, assume that
many identical, atomistic firms produce one homogenous good using one factor of
production, labor. The demand for the good is a function of the real money supply,
as in Equation (1). Equation (1) may be viewed as a simplification of standard money
demand functions.
(1) Q = QD(M/P) .351 MONETARY POLICY AND EFFICIENCY WAGES
Q is the quantity of the homogenous good and P is its price. M is the nominal money
supply.
The firms pay efficiency wages. Equation (2) is the profit function. Equation (3) is
the efficiency function.
(2) πi = PQi(eiLi) – WiLi ,
(3) ei = ei([Wi/P], LE) , εW > 0;  εL < 0 .
πi, Qi, ei, Wi, and Li denote firm i’s profit, output, worker efficiency, nominal wage, and
level of employment. LE is the economy-wide level of employment, the sum of all the
firms’ Li’s. Normalizing the labor force to one, LE equals the employment rate, one
minus the unemployment rate. The εi’s are the elasticities of ei with respect to its two
arguments.
In Equation (2), firm output is a function of eiLi, as is commonly assumed in effi-
ciency wage models. Equation (3) shows efficiency to be increasing in the firm’s real
wage and decreasing in the economy-wide employment rate.3 Efficiency is a general
term, dependent on effort in shirking models, turnover in turnover models, and morale,
fairness, and so forth in other efficiency wage models. Equation (3) is therefore consis-
tent with many motivations for efficiency wages.
In the absence of any rigidities, firm i chooses Li and Wi to maximize profit. The
first order conditions are:
(4) (∂πi/∂Li) = PQLiei – Wi = 0 ,
(5) (∂πi/∂Wi) = [QLi(∂ei/∂[Wi/P]) – 1]Li = 0 ,
where QLi is the derivative of Qi with respect to firm i’s effective labor, eiLi. Combining
Equations (4) and (5), one can find the familiar Solow [1979] condition, εW = 1. This
condition shows that firms choose wages to minimize the real effective cost of labor,
which is the real wage per unit of efficiency, (Wi/P)/ei.
This model can be used to study the effects of a change in the money supply. If
there is no nominal rigidity, money has no real effects. But assume the wage is rigid
in the short run. This could be because of a coordination problem, as in Stiglitz [1986]
and Summers [1988], or it could be because of long-term contracts, as in Gottfries and
Westermark [1998]. The reason is not important.4 While the wage is fixed in the short
run, continue to assume that it is perfectly flexible in the long run. It is important to
understand what this implies about the Solow condition. The Solow condition holds
when firms are free to choose the optimal wage. With wages perfectly flexible in the
long run, the Solow condition holds in long run equilibrium. With short-run nominal
rigidity, it need not hold continuously; see below.
Now, starting from a point of long-run equilibrium, let M increase. To solve for
the short-run results, begin by taking the derivatives of Equations (1), (3), and (4).
These are shown as Equations (6a), (6b), and (6c), respectively. Note that since all
firms are identical, ei, Wi, and QLi are identical for all i and subscripts are dropped. One
might think of e, W, and QL economy-wide variables, each in equilibrium equal to the
corresponding firm-level variable. Equation (6d) is the derivative of the economy’s
production function, Q = Q(eLE).352 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(6a) Q* = ηD(M* – P*) ,
(6b) e* = εW(W* – P*) + εLLE* ,
(6c) P* + ηQL(e* + LE*) + e* – W* = 0 ,
(6d) Q* = ΘL(e* + LE*) ,
where * denotes a proportional change (P* = dP/P). Since all firms are identical and
since the number of firms is constant, LE* = Li*. ηD is the elasticity of Q with respect
to M/P in Equation (1), the demand equation; ηD > 0. ηQL is the elasticity of QL with
respect to eLE; ηQL < 0 by a second order condition. ΘL is the share of labor in produc-
tion, WLE/PQ. Using Equation (4), ΘL = QLeLE/Q.
Setting W* = 0, these can be solved for the short-run effects of a monetary shock.
Note that since nominal wages are rigid in the short run, Equation (5) no longer holds;
this means the Solow condition no longer holds.
(7a) P* = M*[Z/D] ,
(7b) LE* = M*[1 – εW(1 + ηQL)]/D ,
(7c) e* = M*[εWηQL + εL]/D ,
(7d) Q* = M*ΘL[1 – εW + εL]/D ,
where Z = –[ηQL + εL(1 + ηQL)] and D = ΘL(1 – εW + εL)/ηD + Z. D and Z are both positive
by stability conditions.5 To analyze these results, remember that the economy is in
long-run equilibrium before the shock. Thus, if the shock is small, the Solow condition
still holds approximately and εW is still close to 1 (larger shocks are considered below).
With that, one can sign all the results:
P*, LE* > 0 > e*, Q*.
With the monetary shock, Equation (7a) shows that prices rise, lowering the real
wage. From Equation (7b), this raises LE; there are more jobs when the real wage is
low. But from Equation (7c), this implies two negative effects on efficiency. As discussed
above, both the rise in employment and the drop in real wages reduce efficiency.
The efficiency result may be seen as complementary to that of Schmidt [2000a].
He finds that monetary policy may have a negative effect on efficiency if it changes
relative wages (if some real wages fall more than others). The current result is that
even if there is no relative wage change, monetary policy can still lower efficiency.
With LE rising but e falling, the change in output may seem ambiguous, but it is
not. From Equation (7d), output falls if and only if [1 – εW + εL] < 0. At the point of long-
run equilibrium, the Solow condition holds; 1 – εW = 0. Since εL < 0, output falls.
To understand the intuition, remember that firms choose W to minimize the effec-
tive cost of labor, (W/P)/e. From the firm’s first order conditions, ∂[(W/P)/e]/∂(W/P) = 0,
a drop in real wages also lowers e, leaving (W/P)/e approximately constant. With the
real effective cost of labor approximately constant, firms continue to demand approxi-
mately the same amount of effective labor; eLE is approximately constant. Output353 MONETARY POLICY AND EFFICIENCY WAGES
must also be approximately constant, so far. But for output to be constant at a lower e,
firms must raise employment. Once they do, LE rises and so e falls; this effect is
measured by εL. (W/P)/e therefore rises. With a higher effective cost of labor, firms
demand less labor input; eLE falls. When firms employ a smaller amount of effective
labor, output falls.
This analysis assumes that the Solow condition approximately holds. It does so as
long as the real wage is in the neighborhood of the optimal firm-chosen wage. But as
the monetary shock pushes the real wage lower, εW rises.6 From Equation (7d), the
larger is εW, the more output falls with a rise in the money supply, all else equal. The
negative effect on Q is thus reinforced. The intuition here is that as the wage is forced
further and further from the cost-minimizing level, costs rise more and more. This
induces firms to produce less and less.
There are other perverse implications here. First, since the price increase lowers
output, the aggregate supply curve must be downward sloping. In many models, aggre-
gate supply is upward sloping because higher prices cause lower real wages, greater
employment, and greater output. Here, since the output result is reversed, the slope
of the aggregate supply curve is also reversed.7
Second, profits behave in a counterintuitive way. In other models, a positive mon-
etary shock lowers real wages and, since wages are a cost to the firm, lowers costs and
raises profits. Here, the lower nominal wages actually raise labor costs and so lower
profits. For intuition, remember that the efficiency wage is chosen to maximize prof-
its; it is therefore no surprise that a shift from that wage lowers profits.8
In summary, a positive monetary shock lowers real wages and so raises employ-
ment. Lower wages and higher employment both reduce labor efficiency. Because of
the Solow condition, this drop in efficiency dominates the rise in employment; output
falls. Also, profits fall and the aggregate supply curve is downward sloping. The next
section shows that these results also hold in a general efficiency wage model.
A GENERAL EFFICIENCY WAGE MODEL
The previous section highlights the crucial effect of employment on efficiency in a
simple model. To make the model more general, this section modifies the efficiency
equation, Equation (3). Equation (8a) is the more general equation to be used in this
section. Most efficiency wage models include relationships that are special cases of
Equation (8a).
(8a) ei = ei([Wi/P], [WA/P], LE), εW > 0; εA < 0; εL < 0 .
WA is the average wage paid in other firms; εA is the elasticity of e with respect to WA/P.
In Equation (8a), higher wages paid elsewhere in the economy cause efficiency to
drop. One can see the logic of this in a shirking or turnover model. In a turnover
model, high wages elsewhere make workers more likely to move elsewhere. This
raises turnover and so lowers efficiency. Similarly, in a shirking model, unemploy-
ment is not as bad if potential jobs are higher paying. Firing is less of a punishment,
therefore; workers work less hard. Effort and efficiency fall.
Since all firms are identical, WA = Wi in equilibrium. Using that, the total deriva-
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(8b) e* = (W* – P*)(εW + εA) + εLLE* .
Holding W* = 0, one can now solve Equations (6a), (6c), (6d), and (8b) for the short-run
effects of M on P, LE, e, and Q.
(9a) P* = M*[Z/D2] ,
(9b) LE* = M*[1 – (εW + εA)(1 + ηQL)]/D2 ,
(9c) e* = M*[(εW + εA)ηQL + εL]/D2 ,
(9d) Q* = M*ΘL(1 – εW – εA + εL)/D2 ,
where D2 = Z + ΘL(1 – εW – εA + εL)/ηD and Z is as defined in the previous section. As
above, D2 and Z are both positive because of stability conditions. Now, using Equation
(9d) and the Solow condition, (dQ/dM) < 0 if and only if (εL – εA) < 0. This is the condition
for output to fall when the money supply rises. Since both εL and εA are negative, the
condition can be restated as in Condition (10).
(10) dQ/dM < 0  iff  ⏐εL⏐ > ⏐εA⏐ .
Does this condition hold? Published empirical work consistently suggests that it
does. Campbell [1993], Cappelli and Chauvin [1991], Green and Weisskopf [1990], and
Huang et al. [1998] each estimate versions of the efficiency wage model. Each article
provides some evidence that ⏐εL⏐ > ⏐εA⏐. Consider each of these articles in turn.9
Campbell [1993] assumes that efficiency is a function of the quit rate. He esti-
mates an equation in which the quit rate is an exponential function of the wage, the
alternative wage, the unemployment rate, and other variables. This gives estimates
of the elasticity of quits with respect to the alternative wage and with respect to
unemployment (which can be easily transformed into an elasticity with respect to the
employment rate). From his estimates, the effect of the employment rate on quits is
13 to 26 times as large as the effect of the alternative wage. ⏐εL⏐ is far greater than
⏐εA⏐ on these estimates.
Cappelli and Chauvin [1991] assume a moral hazard or shirking version of the
efficiency wage model. In their estimated equation, the rate of disciplinary dismissals
is a function of the wage premium, the unemployment rate, and other variables. The
wage in their interplant, intrafirm study is the same across plants; thus, the wage
premium term captures only the effect of the alternative wage. By their results, one
can find that the elasticity of dismissals with respect to the employment rate is 10 to
250 percent greater than the elasticity with respect to the alternative wage (see esti-
mations (1) and (2) in Cappelli and Chauvin [1991, 782]). Again, this means ⏐εL⏐>⏐εA⏐.
Green and Weisskopf [1990] do not estimate the alternative wage effect, but their
results are still instructive. They run separate regressions for each of 100 industries,
regressing efficiency on the unemployment rate. They find that for the average indus-
try, efficiency rises by 6 percent when unemployment rises by 50 percent (p. 247).
When unemployment rises 50 percent from, say, 6 percent to 9 percent, employment
falls 3.2 percent from 94 percent to 91 percent. Since this raises efficiency by 6 per-
cent, ⏐εL⏐ is about 2. From the Solow condition, ⏐εW⏐ = 1. Thus, Green and Weisskopf’s
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own wage on efficiency is at least as great as the effect of alternative wages; that is,
⏐εW⏐>⏐εA⏐. If so, Green and Weisskopf’s [1990] results also support the condition in
Equation (10).
Huang et al. [1998] also estimate the effects on productivity of the unemployment
rate, wage premia, and other variables. From their conclusion, “a 10% increase in the
unemployment rate is associated with a 1% increase in output” [Huang et al., 1998,
137]. Since unemployment averages 6 percent in their data set, this implies an ⏐εL⏐ of
1.7, again greater than 1. Their estimated ⏐εA⏐ ranges from 0.2 to 0.6 (p. 137).10
If one accepts the empirical evidence, Condition (10) holds.11 So, the results in this
general model are qualitatively identical to those of previous section’s simple model.
When M rises, employment rises. Efficiency falls because of the reduced real wages
and the increased employment. Combining the effects, efficiency falls so much that
output also falls. Also, profits fall and the aggregate supply curve is downward sloping.
The result that a monetary expansion raises employment but lowers output may
seem counterintuitive, but it is consistent with many in the efficiency wage literature.
As mentioned in the introduction, Agell and Lundborg [1995], Brecher [1992], Carter
[1995, 1999b], Drazen [1986], Perri [1990], and Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] present
efficiency wage models in which employment and output move in opposite directions
when some government policy changes the real wage. In the current model, the gov-
ernment policy is a monetary policy.
Given these results, the reader may wonder how other authors have found realis-
tic results in monetary efficiency wage models with nominal wage rigidities. Stiglitz
[1986], Summers [1988], and Gottfries and Westermark [1998] find the traditional
result, that monetary expansions lower real wages and raise employment and output.
To get the traditional result, each of these models must assume, contrary to empirical
evidence, that the effect of employment on efficiency is zero, as in Stiglitz [1986] and
Gottfries and Westermark [1998], or small, as in Summers [1988].12 With these assump-
tions, Condition (10) cannot hold.
The value of the above analysis depends crucially on how general an efficiency
function Equation (8a) really is. Of course, not all efficiency wage models include
relationships that are special cases of Equation (8a), but many do. To see this, con-
sider some of the better-known efficiency wage models. Start with the seminal paper
of Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]. In their paper, effort is an on/off variable, equal to e if
the wage equals or exceeds the efficiency wage, equal to zero otherwise. Combining
their Equations (5), (8), and (11), one can express the efficiency wage as a function of
economy-wide wages (wA in my notation), the employment level (LE in my notation),
and exogenous terms. Thus, the Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency function is a special case of
Equation (8a). In Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], effort depends on the wage paid, which is
the first argument in my Equation (8a), relative to the efficiency wage, which is a
function of the two other arguments.
The efficiency function of Pisauro [1991] also shows effort as a function of wages in
and out of the firm, the unemployment rate, and exogenous terms; see his Equation
(9) and the equations that precede it. The same can be said of Stiglitz [1986]13 and
Salop [1979]. Johnson and Layard [1986] in Chapter 16 of the Handbook of Labor
Economics consider many theories of unemployment. Their efficiency wage models
yield equations that are special cases of Equation (8a); see their pages 960 and 967.14356 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The analysis of this section suggests that, at least in their current forms, effi-
ciency wage models with nominal wage rigidities may not be well-suited to discussions
of monetary policy. What alternative forms are there? To answer this question, recog-
nize that efficiency wage models used to analyze monetary policy, including the cur-
rent one, are typically static, but the effects of monetary shocks likely have important
dynamic elements. So, it may be useful to use a dynamic model. In the model of this
paper, efficiency depends on the wages and the employment level. In a dynamic set-
ting, it would also likely depend positively on expected wage growth and negatively on
expected employment growth.15 In a moral hazard or shirking model, wage growth
makes a job more valuable in the future and so makes the worker work harder to
avoid losing it today. Employment growth means more hiring and so a shorter expected
unemployment spell if a worker is fired. This makes firing less of a punishment and
therefore a worker has less incentive to work hard.
To sketch out briefly possible implications of a dynamic model, assume that there
is no long-run effect of money on real wages or employment. Then, when a positive
monetary shock temporarily lowers real wages and raises employment, it also raises
expected wage growth and lowers expected employment growth. Both of these effects
raise efficiency. If these effects are strong enough, one might find that expansionary
monetary policy raises output. Of course, the development and estimation of such a
dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSION
Several efficiency wage models have been used to analyze monetary policy. In
some of these, including those of Stiglitz [1984], Summers [1988], and Gottfries and
Westermark [1998], rigidities in the labor market keep nominal wages constant. So, a
rise in the money supply lowers real wages. This raises employment and output.
Crucially, each of these papers assumes that the effect of employment on productivity
is small or nonexistent.
The current paper uses a general efficiency wage model to reanalyze the effects of
monetary policy. Here, a rise in the money supply raises employment but lowers
output. This happens because efficiency or productivity falls when the money supply
rises. Following Stiglitz [1984], Summers [1988], and Gottfries and Westermark [1998],
the monetary shock raises prices and so lowers real wages. Low wages and the result-
ing high employment both reduce efficiency. Firing becomes less of a punishment
because the current job pays less, and because fired workers can more easily find new
jobs. Thus, workers work less hard and productivity falls. With lower productivity but
more employment, the effect on output is ambiguous. The ambiguity is resolved using
published empirical results. Using these to parameterize the model, output falls when
the money supply rises.
This result, although perhaps surprising, is consistent with many results in the
efficiency wage literature. In many models, employment and output move in opposite
directions when some government policy changes the real wage. This holds in analy-
ses of minimum wage laws, employment subsidies and taxes, tariffs, and other poli-
cies. The current analysis extends this familiar microeconomic result to the study of
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Thus, to the extent that efficiency wages are important in causing nominal rigidi-
ties in labor markets, monetary expansions lower output. Also, profits fall and the
aggregate supply curve is downward sloping. Of course, the conclusion to be drawn is
not that monetary expansions really are contractionary. Instead, one might conclude
that, at least in their current forms, efficiency wage models with nominal wage rigidi-
ties may not be well-suited to discussions of monetary policy. Alternative models may
be more useful.
NOTES
I thank three anonymous referees whose comments added significant value to this paper.
1. In Summers [1988], small misperceptions regarding wages in other firms can cause a coordination
problem, leading to fixed wages. A coordination problem also keeps nominal wages fixed in Stiglitz
[1986]. Gottfries and Westermark [1998] show that in a turnover model of efficiency wages, it may
be optimal to fix long-term contracts in nominal terms. In other efficiency wage models, goods
market rigidities cause the non-neutrality; see Ball and Romer [1990].
2. Spencer [1998] finds that, in response to aggregate demand shocks, nominal wages adjust slower
than do prices. So, as Gamber and Joutz [1997] find, real wages fall with positive shocks to
aggregate demand. These results are consistent with the efficiency wage models discussed here.
Holmes and Hutton [1996] also provide partial support for these models.
3. Expressing efficiency as a decreasing function of the employment rate instead of as an increasing
function of the unemployment rate simplifies the presentation below. Of course, the two formu-
lations are equivalent.
4. It may seem implausible that firms are rational enough to choose optimal wages yet are incapable
of adjusting wages in the face of a monetary shock. There are several explanations for this, the
specifics of the explanation depending on the model used. As one example, in Stiglitz [1986], the
quit rate at a firm depends on that firm’s wage relative to wages at other firms. In the model, every
profit-maximizing firm rationally seeks to pay the same wage as does every other firm. This leads
to slow adjustment of wages after a shock; no firm wants to be the first to change. Of course, if
firms set wages in real terms instead of nominal terms, money would still be neutral. Real wages
would be constant when the prices change. But there are plausible reasons firms would set wages
in nominal terms. See Niehans [1978, 121] and McCallum [1986, 409-410] who argue that minimiz-
ing transactions and other costs requires that the medium of exchange and the unit of account be
the same.
5. One condition is that as each firm increases its Li, holding Wi/P constant, ∂πi/∂Li becomes negative.
Using Equations (4) and (6b), this implies that Z > 0. The second condition is that as the prices of
goods rise, the demand for goods, from Equation (1), falls relative to the supply of goods, solvable
from Equations (6b), (6c), and (6d). This implies that D > 0.
6. This is from a stability condition. The condition is that, keeping Li at profit-maximizing levels, ∂πi/∂Wi
falls when all firms raise wages. To see this, note that, using Equation (4), Equation (5) can be
rewritten as ∂πi/∂Wi = (εW – 1)Li = 0. By inspection, ∂πi/∂Wi falls from 0 when real wages rise if and
only if ∂εW/∂(Wi/P) < 0.
7. Whatever the slope, the relevant stability condition is still D > 0; see Note 5.
8. Using Equations (2), (7a), (7b), and (7d), one can find that the change in real profits in the economy
is
(π /P)′ = –M*wLEηQL[1 – εW + εL]/PD.
9. Many papers that empirically test the efficiency wage hypothesis are not useful in the current
context. Some, such as Rebitzer [1987], do not estimate the effect of the alternative wage (εA).
Some, such as Wadhwani and Wall [1991], measure the effect of a composite variable, Wi/WA. This
does not allow one to find εA as distinct from –εW. A similar problem arises with the use of Schmidt’s
[2000a; 2000b] results.
10. The results of Campbell [1993], Cappelli and Chauvin [1991], and Green and Weisskopf [1990] are
discussed in more detail in Carter [1999a, 599-601].358 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
11. To see the intuition that supports ⏐εL⏐>⏐εA⏐, note that this condition means that a, say, 5 percent
change in employment has a bigger impact on worker efficiency than does a 5 percent change in
wages paid by other firms. In a shirking model, the greater is the welfare of the unemployed
relative to the employed, the less threatening is being fired, and so the less hard workers work to
avoid firing. Similarly, in a turnover model, the greater the relative welfare of the unemployed,
the more quits. So, Condition (10)’s holding means that a 5 percent change in employment has a
greater impact on the relative welfare of the unemployed than does a 5 percent change in wages.
To see why it likely does, perform a thought experiment. Suppose that the unemployment
rate is 8 percent and wages are $10. Now, consider two possible changes. In case A, unemployment
falls to 3.4 percent (employment rises by 5 percent) while wages are constant. In case B, wages rise
to $10.50 (a 5 percent increase) while unemployment is constant. Which has the greater impact on
the welfare of the unemployed? The employment change greatly increases the worker’s chance of
finding a job. The wage change is only of marginal benefit, and only then if the worker can find a
job. So, the employment change likely has a greater impact on the relative welfare of the unem-
ployed. That means that Condition (10) holds.
12. In Stiglitz’s [1986] turnover model, workers may quit firm i to work at firm j if Wj > Wi; employment
levels are irrelevant. In the Gottfries and Westermark [1998] discrete-time model, workers make
their quit decisions before any monetary shock occurs. Firms make hiring decisions after mon-
etary shocks. So in the short run, shocks can raise employment but can have no impact on quits or
efficiency. In both of these models, εL = 0 by assumption.
There are, to the author’s knowledge, no efficiency wage models with rigid wages that avoid
this basic problem. Realistic results occur only with unrealistic assumptions.
13. Stiglitz [1986] reviews several efficiency wage theories, including models based on nutrition,
turnover, heterogeneous workers, monitoring costs, and sociological theories of fairness. From
his page 187, “Though the five theories differ in a number of important respects, they have a
common mathematical structure: the net productivity of a worker at the ith firm is a function of
the wage paid by the firm, wi, the wage paid by other firms, w, and the unemployment rate (or,
more generally, the expected duration in the unemployment pool).” Except for the parenthetical
reference to unemployment duration as a substitute for the unemployment rate, Stiglitz’s “com-
mon mathematical structure” is Equation (8a).
14. Of course, there are many efficiency wage models in which the efficiency functions are not special
cases of Equation (8a). Efficiency may depend on monitoring intensity [Brecher, 1992] or employ-
ment security [Carter and De Lancey, 1997] when those are firm choice variables. It may depend
on the ratio of the actual wage relative to the workers’ perception of a fair wage, which may in turn
depend on profits [Palley, 1994] or the returns to other factors [Agell and Lundborg, 1995]. None
of these models have been used to analyze monetary policy and it is indeed unclear that any of
them would yield more realistic results.
15. See Kimball [1994], who presents a dynamic version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model.
His model is real; there is no role for money.
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